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The Pedagogy of Rape Law:
Objectivity, Identity and Emotion
Jennifer M. Denbow
In a recent conversation with a number of male law professors, one of them
said: “I don’t teach rape because it’s just too difficult.” I immediately wondered
what precisely was “too difficult” about it. Then I recalled how rape law was
taught when I took a criminal law course at U.C. Berkeley in 2005. For every
other subject covered in that course, the male professor combined lecture and
the Socratic Method to get about 90 students to discover the underlying logic
of criminal law. When we got to the rape law section, however, the class was
broken into small groups. We met in these groups for several class periods.
Second- and third-year law students, serving as teaching assistants, guided us
in discussing rape and the law.
These two instances suggest that instructors of criminal law, perhaps
particularly male professors, have anxiety about teaching the law of rape.
Indeed, as I began to research the pedagogy of rape law, I discovered that
this anxiety is relatively common and that, in response, some instructors either
do not teach rape law in their courses or they teach it, as my own professor
did, in a manner entirely different from the way they teach other criminal law
subjects.1
Despite the modest success of efforts in the 1980s to get rape included in
the criminal law curriculum and while all major casebooks on the subject now
include sections on rape, many instructors intentionally skip the topic. At first
this may seem to be a trivial observation and one that can be easily explained
by the fact that rape is an emotional and heavily charged topic. The limited
scholarship on the pedagogy of rape law, however, outlines other reasons for
not teaching rape law.
Some instructors say they do not teach rape because they do not cover
substantive crimes—except for homicide—in their criminal law courses.
James Tomkovicz, who relates his experience of teaching rape law for the
first time in a 1992 law review article, mentions many reasons for avoiding
the topic, including the risk it presents to the educational atmosphere. For
instance, students who have been victims of sexual assault may find it difficult
and traumatic to participate in or hear a discussion of rape law. For years,
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Tomkovicz did not cover rape in his criminal law course and his justification for
not teaching the topic was that he had too much else to cover. After teaching it
for the first time, however, he realized its pedagogic value and acknowledged
that one of the reasons he had not taught it in the past was that he resented
being told by an “interest group” what he should include in his course.2
Although there are a variety of reasons for not teaching rape law, many
of them focus on the emotional and personal aspects of rape. A persistent
worry is that the issue of rape is too volatile for the law school classroom.
Tomkovicz offers this tentative explanation for the perceived volatility of rape
law discussions:
Discussion of the subject will evoke strong, sometimes irrational, often
intemperate reactions. I do not claim to know the reasons for this phenomenon.
Perhaps it is that the vast majority of sexual assaults involve the victimization
of women by men. Perhaps it is that rape remains a prevalent and critical
problem in our society. Perhaps it is the perception that the predominantly
male shapers of our law have moved all-too-reluctantly to eliminate harmful
stereotypes of women and unfair advantages for men. Perhaps it is that many
women, their relatives, and their friends have been injured, or that many men
see themselves as potential targets of unfair criticism and unfounded serious
charges. Perhaps it is a general unwillingness to be open-minded about
controversial and emotional topics. More likely, it is some combination of
all of these variables and more that guarantees a discussion of rape will be
fraught with the potential for turmoil.3

While many aspects of this assessment likely are accurate, I think there is more
to the volatility of rape discussions and thus to the issue of how and whether
rape law is taught in a law school classroom.
In this article I consider some potential roots of the anxiety surrounding the
teaching of rape law and its actual or perceived explosiveness. In particular, I
argue that the crime of rape implicates issues of identity, gender and emotion.
I explore how the politics of identity figures in the emotional intensity of
rape and in the anxiety around teaching rape law. I argue that the identity
politics framework and its epistemology would stifle classroom discussion and
reinforce problematic understandings of female and male identity. Although I
am critical of the politics of identity, I also argue that it challenges in important
ways many deep-seated assumptions about law, reason and objectivity and
is thus especially threatening to those law professors who take these things
for granted. Emphasizing that rape is too difficult to teach because it is an
emotional topic may mask the deeper ways in which a discussion of rape—
particularly an analysis that views it as oppressive of women thus giving them
special standing to analyze it—challenges ideas law professors take for granted,
such as their own authority, rationality and objectivity. Moreover, it is in part
emotion itself that grounds this challenge.
2.

James J. Tomkovicz, On Teaching Rape: Reasons, Risks, and Rewards, 102 Yale L.J. 481, 483 (1992).

3.

Id. at 505.

18

Journal of Legal Education

I thus explore the pedagogy of rape law through a framework that looks
critically at the questions of knowledge, emotion and authority that are
implicated in both identity politics and traditional ways of thinking about
the law. Many scholars have examined the relationships among law, identity
and emotion4 and some critical attention has been paid to the way in which
identity and emotion play out in legal pedagogy.5 No one, however, has
examined critically how identity and emotion affect the pedagogy of rape law.
By critically analyzing instructors’ reluctance to teach rape law, this article fills
that gap. In doing so, I use the pedagogy of rape law to illuminate broader
issues of gender, identity and emotion as related to rape and the law.
The Politics of Identity
Not long after the conversation in which the law professor mentioned that
he does not cover rape in his criminal law course, a female colleague described
to me her reactions when she heard that a man was writing a scholarly piece
about rape. She acknowledged that she had had a knee-jerk reaction and
questioned his standing to speak with expertise on the subject. Underlying
her reaction was the idea that one must have a certain relationship to and
particular experiences of rape to be able to speak authentically and with
authority about it. Furthermore, she was assuming that only women have the
requisite experience of rape. The possibility and even likelihood that students
will have similar attitudes may be one reason that instructors are reluctant to
teach rape law.
My colleague’s reaction can be understood as a manifestation of what
has come to be known as identity politics. Although the term is often used
imprecisely to refer to a variety of ideas, aspects of identity politics capture
something important about this reaction. In this analysis of the pedagogy of
rape law, I am employing “the politics of identity” to refer to the idea that,
because of shared experiences, only members of a historically subordinated
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group are thought to have the authority to speak about and analyze practices
that are understood as central to their oppression. This perspective is itself a
reaction to the persistent privileging of the perspectives of those in power and
the tendency for those perspectives to be presented as objective reality.6 As
bell hooks puts is: “Identity politics emerges out of the struggles of oppressed
or exploited groups to have a standpoint on which to critique dominant
structures, a position that gives purpose and meaning to struggle.”7
Experience and how it is interpreted play an important role in identity
politics. My colleague’s identity-based reaction to a man’s analysis of rape is
a manifestation of the perspective that, as Joan Scott puts it, takes experience
as “an originary point of explanation—as a foundation upon which analysis is
based.”8 In this case, the experience of being rapable and of being oppressed
through rape, even if one is never actually raped, is understood as providing
a necessary ground for analysis. This understanding takes experience to be
the foundation of analysis rather than that which is itself open to analysis.
It thus consolidates and “takes as self-evident the identities of those whose
experience is being documented and thus naturalizes their difference.”9
Experiences are seen to flow from the incontrovertible fact of identity rather
than, as Scott thinks we should see them, as part of the way in which difference
is established. In other words, taking experience as unquestionable, as the
ground of identity, naturalizes differences and categories like that of woman.
Politically, this phenomenon manifests itself as the uncritical acceptance of
the subject’s identity and experiences as the ground from which the subject
speaks and as the basis of political recognition. Both experience and identity
are understood as foundational and natural.
In the context of rape, identity politics’ uncritical appeal to identity and
experience manifests as a skepticism of male analyses of rape. The postulated
absence of the experience of being raped or of being rapable positions a man
as per se unable to speak about rape. Moreover, if rape is understood as a
means of oppressing women, men are excluded from having the experience
of being oppressed through rape. While I agree with the analysis of rape that
views it as a tool of oppression, when combined with an uncritical appeal to
experience, rape’s status as a tool of oppression may be taken for granted.
In the process, female identity itself becomes bound to rapability. Since only
those who are presumed to have been oppressed by rape—that is, women—
6.
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are given standing to speak authoritatively about it, the connection between
rapability and female identity is solidified.
Simultaneously, male identity becomes bound to the potential to rape
and men’s presumptive status as perpetrators is reinforced. Thus, taking
experience and identity as foundational sets up and perpetuates a binary
understanding of men as powerful rapists and women as relatively powerless
potential victims. This dichotomous understanding is reflected in Tomkovicz’s
discussion of teaching rape in a criminal law course for the first time when he
notes: “All women are potential victims. All men are potential defendants.”10
Crucially, the naturalization of difference that occurs in an analysis of rape
that takes identity for granted reinforces both the link between women and
rapability and the link between masculinity and the capacity to rape. This
characterization challenges neither women’s violability nor the culture of rape
and sexual assault.
Although examining the way in which rape operates as an instrument
of power and oppression is important, identity politics risks binding
the experience of subordination to female identity. As political theorist
Wendy Brown has argued, injury has become constitutive of identity for
marginalized groups. In fact, to the extent political recognition comes to rest
on a subordinated identity, subjects become invested in their own injury. As
Brown writes: “Politicized identity thus enunciates itself, makes claims for
itself, only by entrenching, restating, dramatizing and inscribing its pain in
politics; it can hold out no future—for itself or others—that triumphs over
this pain.”11 On this understanding, identity becomes rooted in injury such
that when identity is naturalized and reinscribed, injury is as well. Injury
itself becomes foundational. Brown argues that “wounded attachments” have
formed “the basis for ungrounded persistence in ontological essentialism and
epistemological foundationalism, for infelicitous formulations of identity
rooted in injury.”12
Rape brings up, viscerally for some, what is understood as the injury of
womanhood. Indeed, rape is commonly viewed as the worst thing that
could happen to a woman and thus as the most severe mark of the injury of
womanhood. This intense identification with violability may stem in part from
the tendency of legal authorities not to take rape accusations seriously and to
put victims on trial,13 as well as other discriminatory practices such as historic
laws that rendered black women unrapable.14 Nonetheless, the identification
10.
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of violability with womanhood has negative effects. When combined with a
politics that assumes identity as a ground of analysis and not as something
open to analysis, rape appears inevitable and foundational to womanhood.
While rape has rightfully been analyzed for its role in the oppression of women,
taking rape as foundational to women’s experience and identity is at odds with
an approach that challenges women’s presumed violability and powerlessness.
Considering the historical and ongoing differences of women’s experience
of rape complicates understandings of the relationships among gender,
identity and rape. As mentioned above, black women were historically not
seen as violable. And, as bell hooks notes, slave women were often blamed
for their own rape and white women were complicit in the sexual assault of
black women.15 While black women have been viewed as unrapable, black men
have been seen as presumptive rapists of white women. Analyzing rape from
an intersectional perspective reveals varied experiences and interpretations of
it.16 It thereby also adds another element to the politics of identity as they may
play out in the law school classroom. Racial as well as gendered tensions are
likely to arise.17
These views of identity, experience and injury provide insight into why
criminal law instructors, especially male ones, would be hesitant to teach rape
law. The instructor’s position as the authority figure in a classroom would
necessarily be challenged when discussing rape since, from an identity politics
viewpoint he would be understood as lacking access to the truth of the matter.
He would presumably lack the necessary experience, injury and identity to
speak about rape. Even a female law professor may be hesitant to teach rape
law since her identity may be viewed as predetermining her analysis and thus
as lacking objectivity, especially if she is a member of other marginal groups.
Additionally, should her analysis depart from the views she is presumed to
hold, she may be vilified, since identity politics sometimes manifests as an
assumption that one’s membership in a group and the group members’ shared
experiences demand a given analysis and political outlook.18
(1990). For a detailed historical account of the intersection of gender and race in colonial
Virginia, see Kathleen Brown, Good Wives, Nasty Wenches, and Anxious Patriarchs:
Gender, Race, and Power in Colonial Virginia (1996).
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The politics of identity also reveals how debate and analysis of rape law
in the classroom might be stifled. The assumptions that only those who are
oppressed by rape should speak about it would hinder classroom discussion.
The belief that there is one legitimate analysis of rape, which is the analysis
grounded in a position of subordination would also stifle discussion.19
Moreover, the binary understandings of men and women vis-a-vis rape, as well
as the idea that experience is foundational, would be reinforced.
Nonetheless, identity politics and the essentialism that may accompany it
need to be understood within the larger framework of who is given authority
to speak. As bell hooks explains:
. . . systems of domination already at work in the academy and the classroom
silence the voices of individuals from marginalized groups and give space only
when on the basis of experience it is demanded . . . . [W]hen [marginalized]
groups do employ essentialism as a way to dominate in institutional settings,
they are often imitating paradigms for asserting subjectivity that are part of
the controlling apparatus in structures of domination.20

Asserting the authority of voice, as hooks calls it, can thus be understood as “a
strategic response to domination and to colonization, a survival strategy that
may indeed inhibit discussion even as it rescues students from negation.”21
As noted above, the identity politics framework would deny a man’s analysis
of rape any legitimacy because victims or potential victims are thought to have
the only legitimate perspectives. This can be understood sympathetically as a
response to the historic denial of women’s perspectives and experiences of rape.
However, it is also important to consider that one of the central legal dilemmas
of rape is precisely the issue of whose perspective matters most. What of the
situation when the defendant in a rape trial claims not to have understood
the actions of the victim as a real protestation? To deny the defendant any
legitimate basis for speaking from his experience is to preclude an analysis
of that perspective and, crucially, an analysis of gendered differences of
experiences of sexual encounters. To deny men any authority from which to
speak, because they are presumptively excluded from the category of potential
victim, is to reify sex difference on the topic of rape and thereby to preclude
analysis of how those differences are constituted. Again, as Scott writes on the
view that experience is the foundation of analysis, “evidence of experience
by her fellow students for arguing in class that there may be some reason for separating
acquaintance rape from stranger rape. Tomkovicz, supra note 2, at 495.
19.
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becomes evidence for the fact of difference rather than a way of exploring how
difference is established, how it operates, how and in what ways it constitutes
subjects who see and act in the world.”22
To curb the frequency of rape this difference is precisely what needs to be
confronted. Examining how this difference is established through practice is
crucial. In other words, if difference is established in part through experience
all experience must be examined critically. Only in this way can gendered
and racial differences of opinion about what constitutes non-consensual sex
be brought into alignment. To be sure, it will take a skilled teacher both to
acknowledge the value in hearing from a variety of perspectives and to critique
those rooted in patriarchal or racist assumptions. This would be unlikely and
the classroom would be volatile if the instructor shared those assumptions.
The view that only women have the requisite experience and thus
authority to speak about rape not only closes off analysis of experience, it also
obscures the prevalence of the rape of men. Male rape is already stigmatized
and underreported, in part because of its associations with feminization
and homosexuality. Although there often is shame in female rape, it is not
stigmatized and silenced in the same way male rape is. This is both because
women are more likely to be targets of sexual assault and because sexual
objectification and the possibility of sexual assault is bound to female identity.
The view that denies men any legitimate basis for speaking about rape
contributes to and reinforces the silence surrounding male victims of rape.
To the extent the identity politics framework takes hold in the law school
classroom, future attorneys will not grapple with the question of how the law
and legal services could better redress the rape of men. In fact, future attorneys
may continue to think that men are not raped.
Objectivity and Emotion
One reason instructors cite for not teaching rape in criminal law courses is
that they perceive rape to be an extremely emotional and sensitive issue.23 The
sensitivity of the issue is further compounded by the fact that it is likely there
will be at least one victim or perpetrator of rape in the classroom.24 Although
the emotion aroused in a discussion of rape may be deeply personal, rape
is an emotional topic precisely because it is not just an individual crime but
22.
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also an instrument of oppression. That is, rape is particularly emotionally
charged to the extent it is understood as a crime of power, the effect of which
is to subordinate women. Since it is that very subordination that serves as
the foundation of identity politics, the emotion associated with rape is itself
intertwined with the politics of identity.
The emotional intensity of rape initially may seem like a legitimate reason
for not discussing it. Yet, probing further into the emotions associated with
rape—in particular, the gendered character of that emotion—and the relation
between emotion and the law reveals that the anxiety surrounding teaching
rape law ultimately may be rooted in problematic understandings of emotion
and objectivity. Additionally, while instructors of any subject may want to
avoid intense emotional discussion in the classroom, law professors are often
especially ill-equipped to deal with emotions and especially challenged by
them because emotions are commonly understood as diametrically opposed
to the reason and objectivity that are presumed to be the substance and
object of law. The legal profession confers expertise on those who achieve
dispassionate distance from a case. The threat of subjectivity and emotion in
the law school classroom is thus particularly worrisome to instructors, who are
seen as paragons of rationality and expert distance.
In fact, on a forum about teaching rape law in criminal law courses an
anonymous instructor wrote:
Rape is a difficult subject to teach, and discuss, well. I think many people
are unable to learn about it in an intelligent fashion. In my experience,
even people who discuss or advocate regarding rape issues (and who are
theoretically capable of having an objective discussion) are frequently unable
to do so. One of the most important lessons we learn in law school is the
ability to “step back” from the facts of the case and analyze/discuss the LAW.
Rape is probably one of the, if not the, most difficult subjects in that respect.25

The author then advised: “Any professor who cannot remain objective
during the discussion should probably avoid rape.”26 Similarly, Professor
Daniel J. Solove wrote on the same forum: “I’m not sure whether the fact
that ‘rape touches close to home’ forces students to focus on the issues. I
think it could possibly be a distraction.”27 As quoted previously, Tomkovicz
writes: “Discussion of [rape] will evoke strong, sometimes irrational, often
intemperate reactions.”28
25.
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These quotations demonstrate the persistence within the legal profession of
the dichotomy between reason and emotion. As is common in legal reasoning,
these instructors express the view that objectivity is acquired through distance.
Being too entangled, too personally invested or too emotional distracts from
objectivity. Put in other words, the idea behind these perspectives on rape
is that being personally affected and having a personal investment in an
issue detracts from the ability to think rationally and with objectivity. These
quotations resonate with what Catharine MacKinnon has argued about
epistemology. She observes that “the basic epistemic question” of law and
science has been taken “as a problem of the relation between knowledge—
where knowledge is defined as a replication or reflection or copy of reality—
and objective reality, defined as that world which exists independent of any
knower or vantage point, independent of knowledge or the process of coming
to know, and, in principle, knowable in full.”29
This distanced view of objectivity is in tension with identity politics. In fact,
this is precisely the kind of understanding of objectivity and reason that the
identity politics framework challenges. As discussed in the previous section,
identity politics seeks to challenge dominant notions of objectivity and reality.
That is, identity politics challenges dominant understandings of epistemology
that assume there is a truth of things as they are in themselves and that we
can access that truth by taking up a distanced stance that is not rooted in
a perspective. Identity challenges legal pedagogy because it makes one’s
experiences epistemically important.
Kimberle Crenshaw suggests a different way to interpret emotion and
debate in the context of rape. In discussing the silencing and alienation of
minority students in law school, she writes:
In many instances, minority students’ values, beliefs, and experiences clash
not only with those of their classmates but also with those of their professors.
Yet because of the dominant view in academe that legal analysis can be taught
without directly addressing conflicts of individual values, experiences, and
world views, these conflicts seldom, if ever, reach the surface of the classroom
discussion.30

It is more difficult to set aside personal values, experiences and world views in
a discussion of the law when the topic is rape. In part this is because so many
in the classroom will have personal experiences with it and will have analyzed
it prior to law school. It will be more difficult for female students especially “to
assume a stance that denies their own identity and requires them to adopt an
apparently objective stance as the given starting point of analysis.”31
The passion associated with the crime of rape—which is so passionate
in part because it is understood as a crime of power that is key to women’s
29.
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social subordination—directly challenges the epistemology that underpins
traditional approaches to legal reasoning. A discussion of rape brings to the
surface questions about objectivity and emotion that usually go unquestioned
in legal discourse. In particular, female students’ emotions may very well
challenge instructors’ distance and objectivity. Perhaps, then, the reluctance to
teach rape law is connected to the fact that rape, more than other crimes and
other issues encountered in law school, particularly in the first-year curriculum,
forces instructors to confront the very notion of objectivity on which their craft
is based.
It is also crucial to note that, like rape, the dominant understanding of
objectivity is bound up with power relations. Donna Haraway argues that
the distanced view of objectivity “has been about a search for translation,
convertibility, mobility of meanings, and universality—which I call
reductionism, when one language (guess whose) must be enforced as the
standard for all the translations and conversions.”32 The distanced, universal
account of knowledge can act as a way of establishing and maintaining power.
The silencing or eschewing of perspectives borne out of the experience of
being rapable or being raped can be especially emotional insofar as it sustains
oppression.
Dismissing emotion as at odds with rational objective inquiry forestalls
efforts to make emotion the beginning of a critical social theory.33 That is, to
the extent the emotion of rape suggests the beginning of a social critique of
gender and power, it is threatening to the established hierarchy. Dismissing
emotion as inappropriate and irrational helps keep hierarchy in place in law
schools. Furthermore, because gender is a salient feature of rape, it means
that to understand the crime one must grapple with gender and social power.
Although law school trains students to pick out the salient features of legal
disputes, it does not equip students to grasp the underlying issues of power
and social inequality that drive so many legal disputes.
Notice, too, that placing the blame on students who are insufficiently
objective and overly emotional insulates the law professor from interrogating
his own subjectivity and the way in which he may undermine the importance
of experience or set up an exclusionary power dynamic within the classroom.
It may be that, as hooks argues, “[u]sually it is in a context where the
experiential knowledge of students is being denied or negated that they
may feel most determined to impress upon listeners both its value and its
superiority to other ways of knowing.”34 Rape becomes an especially volatile
subject in those classrooms in which there is a gendered dynamic that silences
female voices and experience.
32.
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These assessments of teaching rape law resonate with what Patricia Williams
chronicles in The Alchemy of Race and Rights. She describes many instances in
which her stands against racism and sexism in the legal academy are turned
back against her to portray her as the wrongdoer. She gets in trouble for
raising difficult questions that call on faculty and students to account for their
perspectives and acknowledge their privilege. She is viewed as too personally
invested in such issues to be objective.35 Students with “strong, sometimes
irrational, often intemperate reactions” are likely to be implicitly or explicitly
calling on faculty and other students to account for their perspective and
examine their assumptions.
It is worth noting that rape is not the only emotional subject that might be
discussed in a criminal law course. In fact, I doubt there is any area of criminal
law that is completely devoid of emotion. For example, is not homicide an
emotional event? What sets rape apart is not just the intensity of emotions, but
also the fact that rape is generally more personal and emotional for women. When
instructors contemplate teaching rape law, they likely conjure up images of a
classroom that is dominated by women’s emotions. Beneath the surface of the
hesitancy to discuss rape law may well be the old trope of female hysteria: rape
just cannot be discussed within the rational space of the law school classroom
because women will just get too emotional, too hysterical even.
At the same time, it is women’s emotional responses that will render their
perspectives subjective, the product of their particular experience and thus not
generalizable. Although all perspectives have some connection to experience,
only those from dominant unmarked, unencumbered positions are coded as
objective, especially in the rationalizing space of law school. Within the legal
realm, apparently particular, local perspectives and their attendant emotions
are thus easily dismissed. So long as personal investment in an issue is seen
as polluting, distanced objectivity will be privileged. The subjectivity of
the “expert” perspective will continue to be masked and presented as a true
reflection of reality.36
Pedagogy and Epistemic Foundations
While the emotion associated with injured identity is challenging to the
understandings of objectivity and rationality that dominate in law, when
conjoined with an identity politics framework, emotion risks being seen as
foundational. Just as the politics of identity can involve an uncritical appeal
to experience, emotion also is often rendered as foundational, as something
that serves as the ground of analysis but is not itself open to analysis.37
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Scholars both within and outside law are coming to understand emotions as
themselves constructed. Just as I have urged an approach to experience that
views experience as playing a role in establishing difference, rather than as the
ground of difference, I urge a constructivist approach to the emotions.38 In
fact, if both emotion and identity are understood as constructed, formed or
developed in particular historical and cultural circumstances, the law school
classroom emerges as a place where the production of gender and affect take
place.39 Teaching rape law thus may be able to foster critical engagement with
identity, emotion and the role of each in the study and practice of law.40
Both identity politics and the standard view of legal objectivity rely on
an epistemology that does not call on those who claim to have knowledge
to account for their perspectives. The standard view of legal epistemology
relies on the view that there is one true version of reality and that the way
to understand it is to be a distanced, neutral observer. As Crenshaw puts it:
“Dominant beliefs in the objectivity of legal discourse serve to suppress the
conflict by discounting the relevance of any particular perspective in legal
analysis and by positing an analytical stance that has no specific cultural,
political or class characteristics.”41 On this approach to knowledge, it is reality
that determines knowledge and thus the knower’s perspective and position are
irrelevant. In the identity politics framework, one’s experiences and identity
are epistemically foundational, which precludes an inquiry into how identity
and experience are formed. In both approaches, knowers are not accountable
for their knowledge claims. Rather, it is either reality in itself or one’s identity
that determines knowledge.42
A law school classroom that is dominated by either of these perspectives
would be one that would silence some portion of the class. As I have argued,
each approach has its drawbacks and liabilities when it comes to a conversation
about rape. Identity politics is an important response to the privileging of
a distanced, neutral approach to objectivity. In the case of legal objectivity,
those who are too personally or emotionally invested in an issue would lack
the ability to take a distanced, objective approach to the topic. However,
in the context of rape, identity politics involves the privileging of women’s
perspectives on rape in a way that can close off discussion of the production of
and the emotions, see Abrams, supra note 4.
38.
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identity. Those without the presumed requisite experience of rape would lack
the appropriate background and thus could be denied a voice.
Identity politics simultaneously contains within it an important critique of
legal reasoning and objectivity and is easily dismissed within the objective,
rationalizing space of law school. As it plays out in the criminal law classroom,
identity politics might close off discussion and also might be part of the
motivation for not covering rape law at all. The notion that experience cannot
be legitimately challenged because it is the basis from which one speaks leads
to the worry that the classroom during a discussion of rape could become
explosive. No better understanding of either the law of rape or experiences of
rape can ever be reached if it is perceived to be too volatile an issue to discuss.
Although the potential to replicate the problematic aspects of identity politics
in a classroom discussion of rape, as well as instructors’ concerns about their
own authority in the classroom may seem like legitimate reasons for not
teaching rape law, I do not think the best response to the foregoing analysis
is silence.
Since the law school classroom is one place where future legal professionals,
many of whom will have substantial power, form their ideas about rape,
discussion is crucial. Precisely because people have such different and charged
views of rape, it is important that future lawyers at least have the opportunity
to discuss it. Furthermore, the reluctance to teach rape law and the politics of
the pedagogy of rape law cannot be divorced from the historic tendency of
prosecutors and judges to presume that women are the sole victims of sexual
assault and in many instances trivialize rape accusations. Crenshaw argues,
for example, that the reluctance of legal actors, including prosecutors, to
address the rape of black women is rooted in stereotypes of black women’s
licentiousness.43 The law school classroom could serve as a site where such
stereotypes are confronted.
A critical approach to the pedagogy of rape law would take the confrontation
between different ways of understanding rape seriously and would be selfreflective about knowledge and its production. I would call not just for
getting more instructors to teach rape law—and for a related push to reveal
that the decision not to teach rape law is just as political as the decision to
do so—but also for an effort to reveal the space of the classroom, as well as
the claims to knowledge made therein, as political.44 The difficulty will be
in developing a pedagogy that allows for exploration of one’s position and
an inquiry into how that affects one’s understanding of the crime of rape.
Rather than taking the objective as that which has no point of view, it must be
acknowledged that there is no way not to have a point of view. As Crenshaw
notes, not calling “into question the objectivity of the dominant perspective . . .
fail[s] to challenge majority students’ beliefs that the minority perspective
is self-interested and biased, while the doctrinal framework and their own
43.
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perspectives are not.”45 The exploration of experience and identity can thus
destabilize the appearance of legal objectivity and requires those with the
dominant view to account for their perspective. As hooks explains:
. . . a critique of essentialism that challenges only marginalized groups to
interrogate their use of identity politics or an essentialist standpoint as a
means to exerting coercive power leaves unquestioned the critical practices
of other groups who employ the same strategies in different ways and whose
exclusionary behavior may be firmly buttressed by institutionalized structures
of domination that do not critique or check it.46

These critiques show that what is needed is an epistemology that would call
for all to account for their perspectives—that is, an epistemology grounded in
situated knowledges. Haraway writes:
. . . situated knowledges require that the object of knowledge be pictured
as an actor and agent, not a screen or a ground or a resource, never finally
as slave to the master that closes off the dialectic in his unique agency and
authorship of ‘objective’ knowledge. . . . Accounts of a ‘real’ world do not,
then, depend on a logic of ‘discovery,’ but on a power-charged social relation
of ‘conversation.’47

Such situated knowledges will always be partial, but it is possible to inquire
into one’s perspective and partiality. Because the self is always partial and
constructed, it is “therefore able to join with another, to see together without
claiming to be another.”48 Haraway also notes that, although subjugated
knowledges should be open to inquiry, they are the least likely to deny that
knowledge emanates from a perspective. This is because those who are
subjugated frequently confront partial knowledges that are held as universal
and that conflict with their own knowledge. Taking subjugated knowledges
seriously is thus most likely to lead to a world less defined by oppression.49
This is an epistemology that strives for justice. As Martha Minow and
Elizabeth Spelman describe, “The ideal of justice includes an aspiration
to try to step beyond personal predilections and prejudices; the adversary
system seeks to challenge preconceptions by giving full play to competing
perceptions.”50 She goes on to note of judges that, “these aspirations are for
nought if the judge fails to challenge his or her own point of view and takes in
all evidence and arguments without examining the tilt created by his or her own
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angle of vision.”51 A similar dynamic occurs in law schools when instructors
fail to examine their own perspective. Rape law is a difficult subject to teach
in part because it is a topic that is more likely to raise questions, explicitly or
implicitly, about the instructor’s point of view and the foundation of his or her
authority. That is also precisely why it is so important a subject to teach.
Conclusion: Toward a Critical Pedagogy of Rape Law
My arguments in this article serve as a call for rethinking, not just the
teaching of rape law in particular, but legal education and its norms more
generally. Many of the traditional norms of legal education rely on the idea
critiqued in this article that distanced dispassionate reasoning is necessary
to arrive at legal truth. This call for an exploration of critical approaches to
the pedagogy of rape law fits within a substantial tradition of questioning
the norms of legal education and the way in which it alienates those on the
margins and sidelines their concerns.52
Acknowledging the many reasons that rape law is a difficult subject to teach
is the first step toward addressing those difficulties. Rather than pushing an
important issue out of the curriculum because it is not easy to teach, attention
should be focused on how to handle the subject well. This likely will involve
pedagogical experiments. Perhaps my own professor’s tactic of small group
discussions—though ceding before teaching of the topic ever begins that it
is a different and more emotional subject—is a way to keep the topic in the
curriculum and acknowledge its particular politics. Advancing a pedagogy
that does not silence experience but instead uses it as a means of exploring
the differences within a classroom and the way in which those differences are
established would lessen hostility and exclusion.
One problem with the training received in law schools is that it can give
too much importance to legal reforms and present them as key to social
transformation. A potential pitfall of integrating the study of rape law into
criminal law courses is that it could reinforce the propensity to view litigiousness
as fundamental to solving social problems. Sharon Marcus argues that the way
out of what she calls the “rape script”—the social script that casts women as
powerless victims and men as powerful perpetrators—is to focus on combating
rape before injury occurs. Anti-rape efforts focus too much on the law and the
redressing of injury in a way that identifies women as inherently rapable. She
calls for a politics of rape prevention that would aim to provide women with
tools for combating rape instead of just accepting women’s rapability and thus
seeking only redress.53
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Litigiousness can in fact reinforce and be an effect of identity politics.
Brown argues that the politics of injured identity is the basis “for litigiousness
as a way of political life.”54 In seeking legal remedies, injury is redressed, not
challenged or combated. A sole focus on criminal law remedies does not
challenge the idea that women’s injured identity is foundational. A critical
pedagogy of rape law might, then, include an exploration of alternatives
to law. Perhaps an exploration of the injury paradigm could be part of the
conversation. The law school classroom could be a place where discussions of
rape prevention and how to contest the notion of women’s inherent rapability
could occur.
I am not so optimistic as to think that every criminal law instructor will
teach the topic of rape well or with sufficient sensitivity. It is probably the case
that most instructors do not want to use rape law to explore issues of identity,
emotion and objectivity. And many will never question their own perspective.
Nonetheless, I hold out hope that in some instances the law school classroom
could be an important site for conversations in which students and instructors
come to appreciate the partiality of their own perspectives. Although rape
certainly is a challenging topic to teach for a variety of reasons, instructors
who leave it untaught and undiscussed fail to use the classroom to challenge
and broaden their own and their students’ understandings of a serious and
pervasive crime.
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